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<a>BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
<prn> 1.01 This peer-reviewed and edited collection of chapters sets out to detail and 
analyse how the different national insolvency law systems treat the matter of executory 
contracts. When a business becomes insolvent, that does not necessarily bring an end to the 
contracts that business had previously entered into but are pending performance. While the 
subject matter is not new, more and more jurisdictions are having to continue to evolve and 
reform their legal responses to the subject matter in the light of the practical and conceptual 
difficulties a less than flexible approach throws up. There are no easy solutions, it would 
appear.  
<prn> 1.02 Many systems of law provide for the right of the trustee in insolvency to assume 
or disclaim a pre-existing contract. That right is controversial because it creates an anomaly 
in that the trustee appears to have been imbued with the right to speculate on the rise and fall 
of the relevant market and make a decision on the contract depending on which the market is 
heading. That, is seen by some, as flying in the face of common commercial sensibilities. 
After all, most legal systems do not allow a seller (for example) to speculate at the buyer’s 
expense when they are in possession of a binding agreement.  
<prn> 1.03 On the other hand, policy makers are genuinely concerned that if such a right 
were not to exist, that would inevitably lead to much economic waste. Moreover, speculation 
may or may not always be a relevant factor – since the market price in question may be quite 
stable or that there are other factors to assume or disclaim the contract.  
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<prn> 1.04 The philosophy behind this project is that lessons could be learnt from both 
developing and developed countries, and from small and large countries. The aim is to 
identify the key supporters, the stakeholders and the pull-push factors driving the agenda for 
reform. There will also be an analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of how the different 
insolvency law systems treat executory contracts and, where appropriate, policy 
recommendations are suggested.  
<prn> 1.05 In this preambular chapter, we shall draw some general observations from the 
country reports and comment on some of the main challenges faced by the laws of the many 
nations under study. This is not however a summary of the extensive country reports. There 
are elements in our approach in this chapter which might loosely be classed within the 
functional method1 often adopted in comparative law analysis. We draw from the evidence 
provided by the country reports to help ascertain the impact or effects of the legal rules on the 
treatment of executory contracts in insolvency. However, this chapter also engages in a rule-
based comparative analysis in an attempt to locate and identify the different rules and their 
construction within their domestic contexts. The purpose of this conjoined approach is to 
provide practitioners and policy makers with both a cultural and legal perspective of the 
research.  
<prn> 1.06 The functional method, of course, is not without critics;2 however for 
practitioners and policy makers, it remains a useful (albeit possibly narrow) method for 
looking at discrete aspects of good or poor practice. For a monograph which is intended to 
stimulate discussion amongst policy makers and professionals, aspects which borrow from 
the functional method might be justifiable on the grounds of convenience, focus and clarity. 
That said, it should be emphasised that in this chapter dealing with comparative analysis we 
                                                                    
1 There is of course a great deal of literature on the method: see Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional 
Method of Comparative Law’, The Oxford Handbook Of Comparitive Law (OUP 2006) 339 who 
provided the following list. See, e.g., for the United States, John C. Reitz, ‘How to do Comparative 
Law’, (1998) 46 AJCL 617; Mathias Reimann, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the 
Second Half of the Twentieth Century’, (2003) 50 AJCL 671; for France, Marc Ancel, ‘Utilité et 
méthodes de droit compare. Eléments d'introduction générale à l'étude comparative des droits’, (1971) 
23 RIDC 933; idem., ‘Le problème de la comparabilité et la méthode fonctionnelle en droit comparé’, 
Festschrift für Imre Zajtay (J.C.B. Mohr Tubingen 1982), 1; for England, Hugh Collins, ‘Methods and 
Aims of Comparative Contract Law’, (1991) 11 OJLS 396; Peter de Cruz, Comparative Law in a 
Changing World (2nd edn, Routledge-Cavendish 1999) 230 ; for Germany, Hein Kötz, ‘Comparative 
Law in Germany Today’, (1999) 51 RIDC 753; for Scandinavia, Michael Bogdan, Comparative Law 
(Springer 1994), 59–60; for a socialist perspective, Imre Szabó, ‘Theoretical Questions of 
Comparative Law’, in Imre Szabó and Zoltán Péteri (eds), A Socialist Approach to Comparative Law 
(1977), 9, 36-38; for rise and fall in Italy, Pier Giuseppe Monateri, ‘Critique et différence: Le droit 
comparé en Italie’, (1999) 51 RIDC 989. 
2 See generally Ralf Michaels (ibid). 
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are not merely concerned with functions of the rules but also on legal argument, 
interpretation and policy considerations.  
<prn> 1.07 An important facet of this Introduction is that as the stress is on legal themes, the 
subject of executory contracts would be explored without making the fine, technical 
distinctions between administration and liquidation. The issue of executory contracts in either 
of these contexts has been very ably discussed in our national reports. 
  
<a>PROJECT METHODOLOGY 
<prn>1.08 The chapters are grouped somewhat loosely based on the legal family they belong 
to – namely, civil law systems, common law systems, and hybrid systems. The contributors 
are asked to pay close attention to the following themes in their chapters: 
<nlist> 
Section 1 
<blist> 
<bt>Which hybrid and formal procedures are available under current legislation to a 
company in financial or economic distress?  
Which are the requirements for triggering those procedures? If ‘insolvency’ is one of these 
requirements, is this notion provided for by the law? Who can file for these procedures (e.g., 
debtor only, creditors only, both and/or third parties)? Who usually institutes them? 
<bt>Do companies rely on out-of-court proceedings (e.g., direct negotiations with creditors)? 
Have these procedures been regulated by the legislators? 
<bt>Are there any other remarkable features of the domestic legal regime, which are relevant 
to mention in the introduction?</blist> 
Section 2 
<blist> 
<bt>For each of the procedures mentioned in the first section, describe the treatment of 
executory contracts provided by the law. When pacta sunt servanda (contracts shall be kept)? 
When does the principle of paritas creditorum (equal treatment of and distribution among 
creditors) prevail? 
Do special rules apply in the insolvency context? Are executory contracts deemed to be 
assumed or rejected? If statutory assumption or rejection are imposed by the law, what are the 
consequences for the parties?  
Do rules change if the debtor is either the performing or the non performing party? Do rules 
change depending on the nature of the procedure (either reorganization or liquidation)? Do 
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special rules apply depending on the nature of the contract,3 the counterparty (public or 
private), its duration, or its importance for the survival of the distressed business? Can 
contracts be partially assumed or rejected? If no special rules apply, which is the general 
treatment provided in the law?  
<bt>For each of the procedures mentioned in the first section, describe the statutory treatment 
in insolvency law of contractual remedies agreed by the parties in solvent times.  
Are termination and acceleration clauses, sometimes referred as ipso facto clauses, 
enforceable in your country? To which extent (e.g., case-law and definition of ipso facto 
clause)? Is the same solution adopted with reference to all the procedures mentioned in the 
first section?  
Are other clauses with similar effects4 valid and enforceable under current legislation? 
What’s the courts’ attitude towards these clauses? 
<bt>Are there any other remarkable features of the domestic legal regime, which are relevant 
to mention in this section? 
Section 3 
The project team was asked to consider: 
<blist> 
<bt>Any major reforms since the year 2000?5 
<bt>What is the impact of these reform (if any) on the treatment of executory contracts? 
Which was the position of the government, how it changed throughout the reform debate 
and/or years, what contributed to those changes (e.g., economic crisis, EU regulations, etc.)?  
<bt>Are new proposals of reform of the existing insolvency framework being 
explored?<b/list> 
</nlist> 
 
<prn>1.09 In this chapter, the editor has tried to avoid making fine distinctions between 
liquidators, administrators, insolvency practitioners, monitors, official receivers, office 
holders, etc. Fine distinctions would not serve our general comparative law purposes given 
that different jurisdictions will have different ‘officers’ to deal with insolvent or virtually 
insolvent companies. Our object is to assess in a broad brush manner the different approaches 
                                                                    
3 Personal; Sale, hire-purchase and finance lease; Utilities; Labour; Pension; Financial.  
4 Close-out nettings; Flip clauses; Conditional rights; Penalty Provisions. 
5 Before the enactment of the Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings [2000] 
OJ L 160 but shortly after the enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
1997. 
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in law and policy to how executory contracts are treated in cases of ‘insolvency’. So too the 
term ‘insolvency’ would not be deeply discoursed in this monograph. 
 
<b> Prefatory observations 
<prn>1.10 An immediate general observation might be made that in established common law 
systems, there is a good deal of disputations over what some might term the minutiae of the 
principles. In the US for example case-law seems to be divided between the right approach or 
test to identify what constitutes executory contracts in insolvency. Some courts prefer the so-
called material breach test, first propounded by Professor Countryman6 while others opt for 
the functional test. In the US prior to these two tests, commentators have tried to reason that 
executory contracts are property of the estate and therefore could simply be dealt with as the 
trustee sees fit – disclaim or assume. However, such an explanation is defective in that there 
are knock-on effects which could not be ignored. After all, the corporate entity in insolvency 
must pay for the rights it gives away or conversely, pay damages for rejecting or abandoning 
the contracts.  
<prn>1.11 The Countryman test defines an executory contract as an agreement where ‘the 
obligations of both the bankruptcy and the other party are so far unperformed that the failure 
of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance 
of the other’. On the other hand, the functional test which works ‘backward from an 
examination of the purposes to be accomplished by rejection, and if they have already been 
accomplished then the contract cannot be executory’.7 
<prn>1.12 However, although there is some fretting over the definition of executory 
contracts, the approach in England is less conceptually oriented when contrasted against the 
US context. The UK Insolvency Act 1986 allows the trustee to disclaim an onerous property 
without needing judicial sanction.8 The emphasis is on the liquidator’s judgment as to what is 
onerous, and not on any discourse about the meaning of ‘executory’. 
<prn>1.13 Some civil law systems in Europe tend to have specific rules relating to different 
types of ‘executory contracts’ – in Italy, The Netherlands, Finland and Spain, to name a few, 
there are special rules for leases, employment, real property and continuous contracts etc. 
where a generic definition or description of what is executory would not be sufficient. There 
                                                                    
6 V. Countryman, ‘Executory License Agreements in Bankruptcy’, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439, 460 (1973). 
7 In re Magness, 972 F.2d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 1992); see too Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘A Functional 
Analysis of Executory Contracts’, (1989) 74 Minn. L. Rev. 227.  
8 Insolvency Act 1986, s 178. 
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are countries, like Finland, where a distinction is also made between divisible obligations and 
indivisible obligations.  
<prn>1.14 In contrast, countries like Slovenia actually make an explicit definition of the 
term ‘executory contract’ in their insolvency law – the Slovenian Insolvency Act expressly 
defines a mutually unfulfilled bilateral contract (executory contract) as a bilateral contract 
which has been concluded prior to the initiation of insolvency proceedings, and whereby, 
prior to the initiation of insolvency proceedings: (i) neither the insolvent debtor nor the other 
party to the contract have performed their obligation on the basis of the contract, or (ii) 
neither of the parties has fully performed such obligations.9 Swiss law also defines executory 
contracts but is more general – the Insolvency Law is only concerned with ‘synallagmatic 
contracts which had not or had only partially been fulfilled at the time of the opening of the 
bankruptcy’. By means of elimination, other forms of contractual obligations, such as a 
unilateral promise to provide services or money, would be excluded from the scope of 
‘executory contracts’. Other jurisdictions adopt the meaning of the term as provided for by 
their civil commercial law. In Greece for example the insolvency law simply adopts the 
meaning as stated in the Greek Civil Code which defines executory contracts as those that 
impose future rights and obligations for both contractual parties. Cyprus adopts a similar 
approach but places some emphasis on the failure to perform wholly the contract. Although 
reference is usually made in these systems to general civil law, the approach is quite 
pragmatic and courts do not engage in a theoretical questioning of whether a particular 
contractual relationship was executory or not. That matter of fact approach is also adopted in 
countries such as Germany, Denmark, Bulgaria, Turkey and Albania. Yet other jurisdictions 
do pay much attention to the conceptual definition of ‘executory contracts’. In France, for 
instance, although there is no jurisprudence taking the sort of conceptual definitions applied 
by the US courts, French case law and academic commentaries suggest that it is important to 
identify first the performance or obligation which is characteristic of the contract. Then it 
follows that if the relevant characteristic obligation of a contract has already been performed 
before the insolvency procedure is opened, the contract would not be considered to 
executory.10 This approach appears closer to the American material breach test than the 
functional test, but cannot be said to similar. The French approach starts with the construction 
of the agreement to ascertain the obligation of which the entirety contract sits.  
                                                                    
9 See Chapter 20. 
10 See Chapter 12. 
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<prn>1.15 In Latin America, the picture too is not uniform. Although most jurisdictions have 
some prescribed rules dealing with executory contracts, there is often a pragmatic acceptance 
as to what the term ‘executory contract’ means. For instance, the Panamanian legal system 
simply assumes that these are contracts which have not yet been performed and older 
legislation render them unenforceable as soon as insolvency occurs.11 Some other legal 
systems have developed a jurisprudence based on civil commercial law as to the description 
(not necessarily a legal definition) for the term. In Chile, for example, insolvency law 
practitioners and commentators take the view that executory contracts can include promises 
to contract but seems to exclude contracts where one party had completed performance whilst 
the other had not.12 In Chile, an executory contract will lead to different implications 
depending on whether the insolvency procedure in question is an action for reorganisation or 
liquidation. Likewise, in Argentina, there are specific rules for specific types of executed and 
executory contractual obligations in insolvency. Broadly speaking, contracts might be 
classified into three groups: a) contracts that are terminated; (b) contracts that are continuated 
or continuing contracts; and (c) contracts which are suspended, pending a determination as to 
whether they will be resolved or continued through their ‘assumption’ by the liquidator. 
Category (c) includes contracts where either party’s obligations have not been fully 
performed.13 Brazilian law takes a similar line whereby executory contracts can include those 
where neither party has fully performed their contractual obligations.  
<prn>1.16 The picture is similar in Asia – the PRC, while not expressly defining executory 
contracts, in providing for the liquidator’s powers makes a distinction between those 
contracts with an obligation or part thereof to be performed by the insolvent entity and those 
to be performed by the other party. That appears also to be the approach taken by the 
common law based jurisdictions under study in this project such as Singapore, Bangladesh, 
India, New Zealand and Australia. These countries do not provide any explicit and detailed 
definition of ‘executory contract’ content with the notion of contracts with unperformed or 
incomplete obligations. There is no direct engagement with theory, like the US courts have 
been concerned with.  
<prn>1.17 This leads us to the question as to whether having a definition of ‘executory 
contract’ in the context of insolvency is useful. At one level the approach should largely be 
about what to do with contracts calling for future performance and an overly technical 
                                                                    
11 See Chapter 18, p 000.  
12 See Chapter 7, p 000. 
13 See Chapter 3, p 000. 
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characterisation of an ‘executory contract’ would only serve to defeat the object of the law. 
Legalism perhaps is not the best approach to adopt when so much of whether a future 
obligation should or should not be disclaimed is already a matter of business judgment.  
<prn>1.18 In this context it is worth reflecting on the notion of ‘adversarial legalism’; some 
scholars have argued that ‘adversarial legalism’ has in modern legal culture and history 
emerged as a distinctive American legal style.14 In the context of defining the executory 
contract for the purposes of dealing with the liquidator’s power to disclaim onerous contracts, 
we might be able to suggest that given that in the US, such disclaimers may routinely be 
challenged judicially, a particularly legalistic style which emphasises detailed, prescriptive 
rules, substantial transparency in legal tests and formulated principles has developed. It is 
undeniable in the US and parts of the common law world, normative language (such as ‘you 
can disclaim an onerous executory contract’) has to some appreciable degree been coloured 
now by conditionalities typified by definitions. 
 
<a>LIMITS ON ASSUMPTION OR DISCLAIMING OF EXECUTORY OBLIGATIONS 
<prn>1.19 It is not proposed to go into depth on the subject here, given the very full 
explanations provided for in our country reports. The purpose here is to delineate the 
circumstances under which the different legal systems control the assumption or disclaiming 
of the executory contract following insolvency. 
<prn>1.20 It might be said the legal right to assume or disclaim executory obligations is to 
some extent shaped by the modern tenet held in both common law and civil law countries that 
an insolvency event does not bring an end to the contractual relationships of the insolvent. 
That said, as regards assumption of the contract, in the common law tradition, it is 
conceivable though not commonplace that an insolvency event might be construed as an 
anticipatory breach which could then bring an end to the contract.15  
<prn>1.21 On the whole the right to assume or disclaim an executory contract is a matter of 
private law ensuring that the liquidator or office holder has the degree of control to reorganise 
the company. In the case of disclaiming, it is quite clear that many jurisdictions permit the 
office holder to decide whether to disclaim an onerous contract based on their business 
judgment exercised in good faith. Judicial interference is limited as is seen quite plainly in the 
US, Singapore, Australia, Canada, the UK, Denmark, Turkey, Germany, France, Chile and 
                                                                    
14 See generally Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Harvard 
University Press 2001). 
15 See below.  
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others. However, in certain contracts, where there are important public interest at stake, the 
law of the land may restrict that right to assume or disclaim the executory contract. South 
Africa is an excellent case in point. Its political history has been such that land transfer and 
ownership have been highly sensitive. Its Constitutional Law hence makes it absolute that the 
office holder must complete the transfer of land purchased and being paid for by instalments 
– failure to do so would be to cause a serious injustice on those who are poor and vulnerable. 
Disclaiming the contract is out of the question.  
<prn>1.22 There may be less weighty reasons for curbing the right to assume or disclaim 
contracts. In Japan, for example, our country report highlights a Supreme Court decision 
where unfairness was held to be a valid reason to deny the office holder from disclaiming a 
contract. There, a company had paid a substantial corporate membership fee to a golf club 
under which would be refunded in ten years’ time if their membership was cancelled. The 
company went into liquidation and the office holder purported to disclaim all contracts with 
the golf club and sought a refund of the fee. The court denied the company’s claim because to 
do so would be to cause unfair consequences on the counterparty.  
 
<b>Judicial supervision in the reorganization efforts 
<prn>1.23 Most legal systems as we see allow a good measure of discretion and business 
judgment for the office holder to decide whether it is in the creditors’ best interest to assume 
or disclaim an executory contractual obligation. This editor is interested in examining and 
comparing the role of judicial supervision in this regard. 
<prn>1.24 The subject of judicial supervision of course is controversial. On the one hand, it 
is arguable that the decision to assume or disclaim is a matter of good business judgment and 
given the exigency of time, that discretion of the debtor should not be interfered with too 
easily. On the other hand, in a good number of jurisdictions the policy debate has shifted 
away from simply about the decision to protect creditor interest but also about the 
justiciability of such a decision. In matters relating to fairness and justice, it is thus contended 
that the discretion of the liquidator should be subject to a degree of judicial supervision. 
There is probably no right answer here, save the platitude that the optimal position is 
somewhere between the two poles.  
<prn>1.25 The intention here is therefore not to look for that utopian point but simply to 
look at how judicial supervision should be exercised and on what grounds. 
<prn>1.26 First of all, judicial supervision may actually be sought by the debtor in relation to 
executory contracts. In the case of Argentina, for example, in both pre-packaged 
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reorganisation and voluntary reorganisation schemes, while the debtor is free to renegotiate 
the terms of the executory contract, any proposed modification must be submitted to the court 
for approval.16 In the latter, (called ‘Concurso Preventivo’), differing levels of judicial 
supervision is applied depending on when the decision to modify/assume the contract is 
made. Where the decision is made by the office holder before the first 30 days since the 
opening of the Concurso Preventivo, the debtor may choose to fulfil the contract with 
pending reciprocal obligations. To do this, they must seek the court’s approval and 
authorisation. The court is required to consider properly the opinion of liquidator which 
should be based on technical business judgment and be impartial. The court’s role is thus to 
assess whether the decision appears to be impartial and not tempered by bad faith or manifest 
error of judgment. In the case where 30 days have elapsed, the third party may terminate the 
contract promptly or call for performance or compliance. In the first, no judicial supervision 
is needed. The creditor only needs to notify the debtor and trustee. In the second situation, 
prior judicial authorisation is required. Failure to secure judicial approval will result in the 
termination of the contract.17 Naturally the 30-day threshold is a legislative compromise. 
However that shows that the law is not insensitive to the constraints of time and practical 
expediency. For clarity and certainty, if the creditor third party had taken a period of time to 
decide, the courts should necessarily be involved in ensuring that that decision is not unfair or 
impractical, and does not have too extensive a negative impact on other relationships. With 
the various time limits and procedural requirements, the Argentine system is one which 
implicitly takes the view that the lack of clarity can lead to poor, ineffectual judicial 
supervision which in turn results in poor negative restructuring or reorganisation outcomes. 
<prn>1.27 It is trite to say too that a laboriously slow judicial process despite the presence of 
sound rules could well lead to the same negative outcomes. Indeed, our Bangladesh report 
highlights that proposition quite amply; although the legal rules are actually reasonably well 
developed having been transplanted from other parts of the common law world, the under-
resourced judicial and legal system makes the judicial supervision process quite ineffectual.  
<prn>1.28 Judicial supervision might also be found not when the office holder discharges 
their functions, but at an earlier point – the time when they are appointed. In the PRC, for 
example, under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Act, the appointment of an administrator needs to 
be approved by the court. That appointment is not always a matter-of-course exercise. An 
indepth level of evaluation of the competencies and qualifications of the administrator is 
                                                                    
16 See Insolvency Act 1995, ss 71 and 75. 
17 Civil and Commercial Code 2014, s 353. 
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made when the official list of administrators is drawn by a seven person special committee of 
the Supreme People’s Court.18 The court will decide on whether a particular administrator is 
appropriate for the case in question. Hence, where the case concerns wide local concerns, the 
court would appoint an administrator with good local experience and reputation. On the other 
hand, where the case concerns a large commercial entity with extensive reach, the court 
would look to appointing a non-local entity (usually a firm) as the administrator.19 The 
administrator then assumes virtually all control over the debtor and their appointment might 
thus be said to the court’s approval of their power.  
<prn>1.29 That matter is exacerbated by the fact that under the 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law, when the debtor (as against the creditor) files for bankruptcy, unlike many legal systems 
where the courts would merely take judicial notice of the filing, the PRC court has wide 
discretion not to accept the application on the basis that there is no case of bankruptcy.20 
<prn>1.30 Indeed, scholarship on PRC bankruptcy law has argued that the extensive judicial 
discretion and intervention of government policies make the system less efficient than its 
counterparts in elsewhere, such as the US, Europe and the UK.21  
<prn>1.31 In summary, it might be reasoned the role of judicial supervision while important 
as regards how executory contracts are to be treated in administration or liquidation, there is 
divergences in the policy rationale to how judicial supervision should be exercised and 
managed.  
 
<b>Ipso facto stipulations 
<prn>1.32 It is widely known that ipso facto clauses are not treated uniformly between the 
different legal systems and this is properly borne out by the country reports. Some countries 
have had a fully aired debate about the matter of enforceability of such clauses; other 
jurisdictions have not tackled the matter from a policy perspective and have relied largely on 
established principles of law to deal with the issue.  
<prn>1.33 Take Singapore, for example, lengthy debates at various policy and professional 
levels took place – the usual concerns were raised about whether ipso facto clauses which 
                                                                    
18 The SPC’s Regulations on Appointment of Administrators in Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases 
(promulgated by the SPC, effective June 1, 2007), arts 10 and 11. 
19 Note The SPC Regulations on Appointment of Administrators et.al. (ibid), art 15; also Yujia Jiang, 
‘The Curious Case of Inactive Bankruptcy Practice in China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and 
Chinese Bankruptcy Law’ (2014) 34 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 559, 573.  
20 See the PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law arts 2 and 7; also Lijie Qi, ‘The Corporate Reorganization 
Regime Under China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law’,(2008) 17 Int’l Insolvency Rev. 13, 15–17.  
21 See generally Yujia Jiang, supra n. 19 
12 
 
accelerate the termination of the contract would produce a deleterious effect on restructuring 
prospects. The discussion went on to explore the right provided for by these clauses should be 
restricted and be judicially controlled so that the management powers of the liquidator should 
not be unduly interfered with by the creditor who is the beneficiary of the ipso facto clause. 
There also appears to be some evidence, according to the Singapore report, that one reason 
why a good number of rescue proceedings fail in Singapore was because the company 
management refuses to engage in formal proceedings until the very last minute. Thus, if ipso 
facto clauses are unenforceable, that could perhaps induce the distressed company into 
starting discussions about rescue a little earlier on. However, after weighing up the pros and 
cons, the Singapore Government decided not to change the status quo – namely, that which 
mirrors the English common law position, that is to say, ipso facto clauses will remain valid. 
The main argument for keeping the status quo was that as a global financial and commercial 
hub, it would be insensible for Singapore as a small state to go its own way and adopt a 
different approach to that which has held sway in jurisdictions that have derived their laws 
from the English common law.  
<prn>1.34 On the other hand, Canada and Australia have taken the confident step to depart 
from the traditional orthodoxy that ipso facto clauses, as a freely entered into contractual 
clauses, are enforceable subject to a careful application of the legal rules on construction of 
contracts. Like Singapore, debates were had as to the impact, negative or otherwise, of ipso 
facto clauses. Unlike Singapore, Australia and Canada decided to legislate against ipso facto 
clauses – Canada took the step in 2009 whilst Australia, more recently in 2016/17. The 
Canadian experience is a little less of a stark change than the Australian in that the Canadian 
courts have (in the context of large insolvencies22) been careful to restrict the application of 
ipso facto clauses even before the law reforms in 2009. However, the matter is properly put to 
rest – the new law and the Australian legislation both expressly render unenforceable those 
ipso facto clauses which allow for the termination of contracts solely on the basis of an 
insolvency event if a business comes under the control of an administrator or receiver or if 
the company is utilising draft proposed safe harbour23 arrangements.24 In Australia, the new 
                                                                    
22 Those falling within the scope of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act 1985. 
23 It should be noted that unlike the US Chapter 11 scheme, the Australian Safe Harbour is not a 
Court-controlled process. As such, there is no scope for cramming down dissenting creditors or 
granting super-priority status for fresh debt. 
24 Australian Government Productivity Commission (n150), 32–33, 360≠365. 
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law also allows ‘suppliers’ to apply to the court for an order to terminate the contract in 
circumstances of ‘undue hardship’.25 
<prn>1.35 It is well and good for certain common law jurisdictions like Canada and 
Australia to take this approach – however, the reforms are themselves not without challenges, 
doctrinally speaking. Our Singapore report highlighted how even if ipso facto clauses are 
banned, creditors may argue that the insolvency event nevertheless constitutes an anticipatory 
breach of the contract. The common law jurisprudence on anticipatory breach is at best 
uncertain, and at worst, conflicting.26 Thus, for a ban to work effectively, the law should 
ideally also remove or limit the right to claim anticipatory breach – however, the limiting of a 
common law general principle of contract law is not something which common law systems 
are generally quick to do. Having the security blanket of the status quo offered by the 
traditional English common law system is not necessarily a negative. Noting the case of 
Bangladesh, it is clear that the corporate insolvency law system in Bangladesh is very much 
in its infancy and having its roots in the English common law tradition means that there 
should not at least be a lacuna should challenges around ipso facto clauses do surface.  
<prn>1.36 The Australian response however is understandable. The events leading up to the 
reform were significant. As is pointed out by our Australian report, the fallout from the 
collapse of One.tel primarily because their suppliers, Telstra and Optus, promptly exercised 
their rights under their ipso facto clauses and that quite peremptorily brought down the 
company in hours. Reform driven by real and significant events is of course understandable; 
however, it is also important to beware of any knee jerk response.  
<prn>1.37 In jurisdictions where there is no specific provision for ipso facto clauses, one 
should not conclude too quickly that there is a vacuum in the law. Such a provision or at 
least, the utility or use of such a device may actually be dealt with by general principles. 
However, that reliance on general principles to resolve disputes and controversies is 
sometimes tempered by regard to the controversial nature of ipso facto clauses globally.  
<prn>1.38 Take the PRC, for example, ipso facto clauses are not specifically recognised or 
unrecognised in law. Article 93 para 2 of the PRC Contract Law permits parties to agree to 
the conditions under which either party may bring an end to the contract. It is immediately 
obvious that although article 93 does not explicitly refer to ipso facto clauses, it could be 
extended to cover such clauses. There are also procedural constraints to the invoking of such 
a right as we see in our PRC report. Proper notice of the condition being met must be given 
                                                                    
25 Ibid. 
26 As the Singapore case of STX Mumbai [2015] SGCA 35 demonstrates. 
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by the person seeking to terminate the contract.27 Moreover, the respondent may challenge 
the legitimacy of the purported termination in court or arbitration. In short although 
technically speaking such clauses do not run foul of the law, in adjudicating their legitimacy 
the courts would be keen to ensure that workers’ rights are properly protected28 and that the 
general rationale of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law to confer sufficient discretion and 
management control on the administrator should not be defeated.29 It is quite clear from the 
various commentaries on the subject that the controversy surrounding ipso facto clauses has 
also surfaced in the PRC. Consequently, no PRC court or arbitration will ignore the potency 
of such clauses in restricting the administrator’s powers to continue with the contractual 
relationships in the commercial interest of the company and the creditors. 
<prn>1.39 Noting that the PRC’s insolvency system was only recently reformed in 2006 and 
despite the fact that commentators in the PRC have clearly and early on picked up on the 
problem of executory contracts and ipso facto clauses, one might be critical that there is no 
specific treatment of the subject in the law reform. However to argue that would be perhaps 
unfair.  
<prn>1.40 As is obvious in the case of Australia and Singapore, the matter is not resolved – 
not only are there far too many uncertainties about the impact of an outright ban, problems 
too abound if such clauses are expressly recognised and enforced. Perhaps the matter, as far 
as some countries are concerned, is best left untreated at present while there is yet global 
consensus as to the optimal solution. That seems to be the case with countries like the PRC 
that have introduced reform to insolvency law in recent times such as Turkey, Croatia, 
Russia, Lithuania etc. In the case of Russia, there is little provision for even executory 
contracts more generally.  
<prn>1.41 It might also be suggested that despite the lack of direct legal treatment on the 
subject of ipso facto clauses in these countries, because of the lacuna regard may be had to 
public policy. In Lithuania, for example, our report tells us that ipso facto clauses are not 
banned and their enforcement has not, from available evidence, led to any unjust economic 
difficulties for all concerned. However, as is common with many jurisdictions the validity of 
the clause could ultimately be tested against the meter bar of public policy. The question is 
thus whether it might be argued that a case like One.tel in Australia which led to the loss of 
several thousand jobs and many contracts entirely demolished, the exercise of ipso facto 
                                                                    
27 See Contract Law of The People’s Republic of China 1999, art. 96. 
28 See p 000.  
29 See p 000.  
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rights might be ruled illegitimately under public policy considerations. From an English law 
standpoint, the reliance on public policy considerations in a matter which would be best 
legislated by Parliament would clearly not be encouraged. 
<prn>1.42 There is also, in some of those countries without an explicit framework for ipso 
facto clauses, acknowledgement that such clauses are commonplace and would thus be 
permitted at least in practice, if not expressly in law. In Turkish law, for example, ipso facto 
clauses are generally acknowledged and applied in practice but the law is silent on their 
enforceability. Insolvency practitioners or liquidators will, guided by convention or practice, 
not law, approach creditors with a view to resolving potential disputes over the exercise of 
ipso facto clauses.30 That does not however mean that there is no judicial intervention. In 
exceptional cases where the invoking of the ipso facto clause would conflict with a judicially 
sanctioned scheme of arrangement, the court would restrict its application by setting 
appropriate conditions.  
<prn>1.43 Countries which have expressly restricted or prohibited the use of ipso facto 
clauses include the US, France, Greece, Denmark, Germany, the UAE, Canada, Australia, 
Austria, Spain to name a few. There are a few observations to be had. First, although in most 
of these countries the rationale is for the preservation of the company so as to encourage 
rescue, the scope of the proscription differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some countries 
like Austria link the prohibition on ipso facto clauses to an automatic stay or suspension of 
contracts. Others like Spain do not enforce the ipso facto clause but presume that the 
contracts shall continue to be performed until an express application is made by the liquidator 
or administrator to terminate an economically onerous relationship. The other party does not 
have the right to terminate the contract. Secondly, most of these countries provide for 
exceptions to the general proscription. These exceptions may lie in contractual relationships 
where performance is virtually uneconomic and impacts on security interests (such as close-
out netting, and other financial contracts), or impinges on personal liberties (such as 
employment contracts, and contracts of a personal services), or is impossible (such as 
contracts for derivatives). Thirdly, the scope of the ban on ipso facto clauses is not always 
fully formed given that in a number of countries, the prohibition had stemmed from recent 
reforms. There is little clarity as to the general principles which would be taken to bear on 
any decision as to the scope and interpretation of the prohibition and its exceptions.  
 
                                                                    
30 See footnote 9 of the Turkey National Report (infra). 
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<b>Assignment of executory contracts  
<prn>1.44 A related matter is how and to what extent assignment of the executory contract 
to a third party should be factored in the law relating to executory contracts in insolvency. 
From our country reports, it is clear that not all countries have special rules dealing with 
assignment of executory contracts. Assignment of executory obligations has an important role 
alongside the provision for assumption of contracts in insolvency. It can assist in the further 
attempts at reorganising the corporate landscape. Where the contract is assigned (in some 
jurisdictions following the assumption of the contract by the liquidator), the corporate debtor 
might be able to avoid its contractual obligations since the performance would thence be 
taken over by the assignee whilst at the same time, prevent the original claimant from 
pursuing the legal claim against them. In the reorganisation process, it is not unforeseeable 
that an assignment will follow the sale of the debtor company’s assets. 
<prn>1.45 Often the matter is left to general law – after all, an assignment of a debt is not 
merely a matter of interest in insolvency law. We see this position in a number of common 
law countries. In the USA for example while the Bankruptcy Code provides for the 
circumstances an assignment of an executory contract would be permitted, it does not set out 
defining the meaning of assignment. That latter is largely a matter for general civil law of 
obligations. It is difficult to generalise about civil law jurisdictions – in the case of Denmark, 
for example, the matter of assignment of executory contracts is given extensive legislative 
coverage. 
<prn>1.46 In the interest of the collective creditors the DBA therefore grants the right for the 
debtor-in-possession to assign the continued executory contract to the buyer of the business 
without consent from the contracting party.31 The right to assign can only be exercised as part 
of a transfer in the ownership of the business and not in a one-off asset sale. This all-or-
nothing approach might be somewhat restrictive but one can understand the safeguarding and 
practical reasons for the constraint. After all, as the law makes explicit any such endeavour is 
to be for the collective interest of the creditors. The other practical constraint is that some 
contracts simply could not be transferred because of their distinctive, specific nature, i.e., if 
the contract can only be fully performed by the original contracting party. On the whole a 
transfer or assignment can be done without consent (save in those where by their legal nature, 
the contracts could not be performed by another party without cooperation and consent from 
the original contracting party).  
                                                                    
31 Danish Bankruptcy Act , s 14 c (2). 
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<prn>1.47 On the other hand, Russia – clearly permitted but its control seems very much to 
be a matter of judicial discretion. It appears to this editor that much of insolvency litigation in 
Russia is guided by legal rules which are often imprecise allowing for practical and policy 
considerations to be taken into account when judicial decisions are made. That seems to be 
the case as regards executory contracts and the matter of assignment of contracts. There is a 
significant degree of expectation that any scheme should pass the good faith test.32 That is a 
test in the general civil law, and not some insolvency law notion. On that basis, it might be 
suggested that in civil law jurisdictions, at least in theory, regard may be had to notions of 
transparency, honesty, and loyalty to the contractual relationships. The latter is often equated 
also with ensuring an equilibrium in the contractual relationship or discouraging 
opportunism.33 
<prn>1.48 The practical difficulty is that in urgent times when a distressed company needs to 
be reorganised, dealing with the question of validity of the assignment after the event is 
usually self-defeating. A more efficient way is for the assignment to be made subject to prior 
judicial approval. It is however not often clear in some legal systems whether prior approval 
is actually required. Where permitted, it might be useful for the office holder to seek judicial 
approval for the purported assignment.  
<prn>1.49 Practicalities undoubtedly play an important role in positing the role of 
assignment in a corporate reorganisation exercise. In the case of the PRC, where the law is 
not very explicit about the treatment of executory contracts, assignment of the contracts to 
third parties (subject to the governance of the general principle of good faith and Government 
policy) might justifiably be seen as a practical means to avoid having to litigate the niceties of 
executory contracts and attendant contractual stipulations such as ipso facto clauses. The 
advantage with assignment as a device to help with the reorganisation exercise is that 
assignment is usually properly provided for by general contract law and no change to any 
insolvency law is needed.  
<prn>1.50 In common law countries, there is, as to be expected, varying degrees of 
prescription as to the scope of the power of assignment. What seems obvious is that there is 
due recognition of the role of assignment in the reorganisation of the distressed company. 
                                                                    
32 The Civil Code of Russian Federation, art 1. 
33 See Saul Litvinoff, ‘Good Faith’ (1996) 71 Tulane Law Review 654, 675; Simon Whittaker and 
Reinhard Zimmerman, ‘Good Faith’, in Reinhard Zimmermann and Simon Whittaker (eds), European 
Contract Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape (CUP 2000), 7–62; Martijn W. Hesselink, ‘The 
Concept of Good Faith’, in Arthur S. Hartkamp, Martijn W. Hesselink et al. (eds), Towards a 
European Civil Code-Fourth Revised and Expanded Edition, (Kluwer Law International 2010), 619–
49. 
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However most such assignments will require judicial supervision or approval. In Canada, for 
example, the law is expressed in these terms: the court ‘may make an order assigning the 
rights and obligations of a bankrupt under the agreement to any person who is specified by 
the court and agrees to the assignment’.34 Judicial approval in the Canadian context is 
dependent on various factors, including, whether the proposed assignment is approved by the 
monitor, whether the assignee would be able to perform the contractual obligations and 
whether it was appropriate to assign the rights and obligations to that person. There is much 
scope thus for judicial discretion – but that is discretion guided more general principles of 
creditor protection, asset protection and perhaps wider policy considerations. That said, the 
last is not explicitly expressed by court decisions or the legislation itself but from the tenor of 
the language of the law (the use of the word ‘appropriate’) the legislative intent is clearly not 
to be over restrictive as to what factors would be considered in giving approval for the 
assignment. Judicial approval however may not be required in all common law countries 
however there may be grounds to challenge the assignment on equitable grounds.35 
<prn>1.51 Both common law and civil law countries tend generally to have restrictions on 
what contracts could be assigned. The subject is amply discussed in our country reports. 
However, in the interest of completeness, the topic of anti-assignment clauses merit 
examination.  
<prn>1.52 At one level anti-assignment clauses might conceivably be treated as an 
equivalent to ipso facto clauses and it can certainly have a significant impact on the corporate 
reorganisation plans. That is especially so if the clause prevents the assignment not only of 
rights but also debts. Distressed companies could find it near impossible to seek receivable 
financing under those circumstances. In a UK context, a recent law was enacted to ban 
clauses which seek to prevent the assignment of receivables.36 That law does not ban anti-
                                                                    
34 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 1985, s 84 (1). See too Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act 
1985, s 11(3) where court approval for assignments in large scale insolvencies is also required. 
35 See e.g, England and Wales Insolvency Act 1986, para 74, Sch. B1 in the case of a company 
administrator’s decision which unfairly prejudice one or a group of creditors. That said, without 
proper judicial guidance it is difficult to say what the scope and limits of judicial control might be.  
36 Section 1 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 states: 
<quotation> ‘(1) The appropriate authority may by regulations make provision for the purpose of 
securing that any non-assignment of receivables term of a relevant contract— 
 (a) has no effect; 
 (b) has no effect in relation to persons of a prescribed description; 
 (c) has effect in relation to persons of a prescribed description only for such purposes as may 
 be prescribed. 
(2) A ‘non-assignment of receivables term’ of a contract is a term which prohibits or imposes a 
condition, or other restriction, on the assignment (or, in Scotland, assignation) by a party to the 
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assignment clauses generally, only those clauses impacting on receivables.37 In gross, under 
the common law such clauses are valid.  
<prn>1.53 In the USA, 11 United States Code § 365 provides for the power of the office 
holder to assign the executory contract to a third party. The legal position is also that any 
clauses preventing the assignment would usually not be enforced. There are exceptions to the 
general rule. One exception arises in contracts that are not assignable to third parties under 
applicable law and the party does not consent to such assumption or assignment. There is 
much literature and case law as to the meaning and scope of ‘applicable law’.38 It suffices to 
say that despite inconsistent judicial practice, there is inclination to construe ‘applicable law’ 
narrowly so as not to defeat the assignment of executory contracts. The US courts also make 
a distinction between what is non-assignable and what is non-delegable.39 Pulley writes, 
‘Ostensibly, the rationale for distinguishing non-delegable, or personal service, contracts 
from other contracts is that these laws generally give the party receiving or rendering 
performance the option to refuse an alternate performer, rather than making the refusal 
automatic.’40  
<prn>1.54 At this juncture it might be useful to reproduce the relevant USC provision, s 
365c: 
<quotation>the trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of 
the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or 
delegation of duties, if— 
 (1) (A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract  or 
lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an  entity other than 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
contract of the right to be paid any amount under the contract or any other contract between the 
parties. 
(3)A contract is a relevant contract if— 
 (a) it is a contract for goods, services or intangible assets (including intellectual property) 
 which is not an excluded financial services contract, and 
 (b) at least one of the parties has entered into it in connection with the carrying on of a 
business.</quotation> 
37 For an account of the reasons for and against the legislative change, see Louise Gullifer, ‘Should 
Clauses Prohibiting Assignment Be Overridden by Statute’ (2015) 4 Penn St. JL & Int'l Aff. 47. See 
also Akseli Orkun, 'Contractual Prohibitions on Assignment of Receivables : an English and UN 
Perspective.', (2009) 7 Journal of Business Law 650. 
38 See generally the literature reviewed in Theresa R. Pulley, ‘Limitations on Assumption and 
Assignment of Executory Contracts by Applicable Law’, (2001) 31 New Mexico L. Rev. 299. 
39 ‘At [US] common law, many courts interpreted ‘applicable law’ under section [365](c)(1) to apply 
only to non-delegable, personal service contracts. Thus, even if a law existed that prohibited 
assignment, that law might not be sufficient to prohibit assumption and assignment under section 
(c)(1).’ Pulley (ibid.) at p 309. 
40 Ibid. 
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the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not such  contract or lease prohibits or 
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of  duties; and 
 (B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment  …</quotation> 
<prn>1.55 In the US, there is also the vexed issue as to whether the ‘applicable law’ in 
question means that where such a law exists, not only the assignment but also the assumption 
of the executory contract is made impossible. Naturally the matter is largely a question of the 
interpretation of the US statute in question. From a functional comparative analysis, it 
suffices to observe that to interpret the law as extending to both assignment and assumption, 
from a policy standpoint, would be place non-debtors on a stronger footing than debtors. 
Although that per se is not objectionable (in that the non-debtor had not asked to be made a 
party to the proceedings in the first place), favouring the non-debtor over debtors could well 
disturb the rationale which is intended to support the debtor in their reorganisation plans.41 It 
would seem to permit a creditor, at will, to pull out of the contract which, under normal 
circumstances, had been properly assumed on the basis of a technical ban. Thus, in a majority 
of decisions in the US, the view is that unless assignment is actually contemplated, 
assumption of the contract would not be prevented. That said, such a constraint does not seem 
to have surfaced in other jurisdictions. 
<prn>1.56 In Nordic and Baltic states, there is an influential academic commentary42 calling 
on the recognition of the right of the insolvent company to assign the executory contracts but 
subject to certain limitations. These limitations might be said to reflect an emerging 
consensus that such measures can assist in the reorganisation efforts of the company but 
should be practicable and be based on good faith. The Nordic-Baltic Recommendations on 
Insolvency Law,43 as the commentary is titled, recommends that an assignment should be 
enforced when: 
<nlist> 
(i) The insolvent has declared its intention that the contract should be continued (namely, the 
contract is assumed); 
(ii) It is reasonably clear that the assignee will be able to perform those obligations; and, 
(iii) The counterparty would not be substantially disadvantaged by the assignment.44 </nlist> 
                                                                    
41 Ibid., at 314. 
42 Produced by the Nordic-Baltic Insolvency Network  
43The Recommendations (Wolters Kluwer 2016) are available here http://www.sccl.se/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Nordic-Baltic-Recommendations-Final-Version-bok-rotated.pdf. 
44 See paras 15–16. 
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<prn>1.57 The Recommendations go on to suggest that contractual terms which seek to limit 
the general right of the insolvent to assume, disclaim and assign executory contracts should 
have no effect. Although the Recommendations do not have legally binding force, it is 
important to stress that in those Baltic and Nordic countries where there are no explicit 
provisions on the subject, these recommendations do have their origin in a good number of 
important commentaries and legal treatises.  
<prn>1.58 It is difficult to envisage any legal system not permitting assignment of executory 
contracts – however, it must not be forgotten that not all legal systems define executory 
contracts in exactly the same way as we have discussed above.  
 
<b>Value extraction  
<prn>1.59 Preserving value is clearly needful. However, in the cut and thrust corporate 
world there are ‘investors’ who seemingly step in to rescue the financially distressed 
company with a less than savoury agenda. These predatory investors through setting up 
complex investment vehicles or arrangements may be entitled to extract in full or in part the 
value of their investment back and to strip the company’s assets before the company 
eventually goes into an insolvency process. This prolonging of the company’s demise and 
subsequently depletion of the corporate assets can undoubtedly lead to even greater damage 
to creditors and employees. There is little comparative law work on this subject which is 
increasingly troubling governments. This work goes a little distance to demonstrate that the 
matter of value preservation should not be considered in a discrete manner – value 
preservation has to be placed in a longer term context.45 In the UK, in March 2018 a 
consultation was launched to invite comments on a proposal to claw back such financial gains 
from investors who have extracted value in this manner. The Consultation Paper gives some 
examples of such value extraction arrangements: management fees; excessive interest on 
loans, charges over company property being granted; excessive director pay or other 
payments; or sale and leaseback of assets.46 These types of transactions may unfairly benefit 
certain parties whilst putting creditors in a worse position than they would otherwise have 
been in should that company subsequently become insolvent. 
<prn>1.60 While it could not be said that all such rescues would fail, the UK Government is 
                                                                    
45 See e.g., country reports from Australia, the USA, Denmark, Germany, and Singapore to name a 
few. 
46 Insolvency and Corporate Governance Consultation Paper 2018 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/691
857/Condoc_-_Insolvency_and_Corporate_Governance_FINAL_.pdf at p. 14. 
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concerned that if they do fail that other creditors and other stakeholders are treated fairly and 
should not have to be left in a worse off position. The challenge is thus not to ban such 
investments (whereby the investors assume control of the company and then assumes existing 
contracts) but to ensure that any law to claw back unfair gains made by those investors is 
sufficiently clear in its scope of application. It will also be needful to show that the initial 
investment had actually not added real value to the company – that will be highly 
problematic, though. The question of real value is always a difficult one in law. There is also 
the problem of how insolvency practitioners or office holders can unpick those complex 
value extraction arrangements. Many will be watching the developments in the UK in this 
regard. Although the subject falls outside the scope of our project on executory contracts, it is 
undeniable that executory contracts form only one cog in the larger wheel of the subject of 
corporate rescues.  
<a>CONCLUSION 
<prn>1.61 This Introduction has attempted to draw on the rich materials the national reports 
have produced. It is hoped that its analysis of the key legal (as against policy) themes has 
gone some distance to show that despite the policy concerns about reorganisation, rescue and 
the preservation of value in the context of executory contracts, the legal rules can in 
themselves lead to results which may not sit well with the policy objectives. The Introduction 
has also demonstrated that policy objectives can sometimes be overreached by the trustees or 
supervising court. In common law jurisdictions, that notably arises when highly judicialised 
tests are devised and applied to deal with definitions and to guide the office holder’s 
discretion and/or judicial supervision. A highly judicialised approach could inevitably lead to 
confusion and causes dispute and controversies. In civilian legal systems, on the other hand, 
the overreaching occurs because judicial discretion and government influence are left 
unbridled – as insolvency laws in a good many of civil law countries tend to be fairly 
perfunctory, much is left to the good sense of the supervisory tribunals. Although that has the 
advantage of an experienced court ensuring good faith and neutrality are maintained, in less 
developed or less resourced jurisdictions, the system may lead to unfairness or arbitrariness. 
<prn>1.62 Naturally there is no one right answer to any of the challenges discussed in this 
Introduction. That is very much because a solution in one jurisdiction could and would not 
work well in another. The fact remains that whether we are referring to a civil law country or 
a common law one, insolvency law interacts and intersects with different established laws, 
private and public. That means any solution, whether simple or complex, is likely to produce 
a knock-on effect elsewhere in the law.  
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<prn>1.63 It suffices thus for practitioners, policy makers and scholars of insolvency law to 
experiment with good practices elsewhere but always having an eye on the wider legal 
tapestry. The challenges we face are global but uniform global solutions are likely to be 
counterproductive unless other legal principles and rules are also changed.  
<prn>1.64 In closing, the editors are especially grateful to the contributors for their sterling 
work in producing such a readable volume of often technical material.  
 
